Literature on democratic backsliding has identified democratic norms as a bulwark against growing authoritarianism. As such, enforcement of democratic norms among citizens is considered a key mechanism in preventing democratic erosion. However, two assumptions would complicate this argument if violated. Firstly, if citizens do not perceive expressing antidemocratic sentiments as a social norm violation, no enforcement can be expected. Secondly, following social identity theory, norm enforcement might not be uniform: the perceived political identity of the norm violator could affect sanctioning intentions. Literature on democratic hypocrisy suggests that citizens excuse anti-democratic behaviour from political in-groups, while subjugating out-groups for the same behaviour. On the other hand, findings on the black sheep effect imply that individuals sanction in-group violators more harshly in order to maintain group image. In this way, these theories lead to opposite expectations on the effect of perceived political identity on sanctioning intentions.

This paper addresses this puzzle by investigating the case of freedom of expression in Spain. Firstly, an original incentivised survey assesses whether social media posts calling for the curbing of this principle are perceived as violations of a social norm. Then, an online experiment examines whether the presence of political cues of radical political allies or adversaries affects the likelihood of flagging these posts. Our results indicate that while antidemocratic expressions are perceived as violations of a social norm, norm enforcement among citizens is far from uniform. In line with the democratic hypocrisy hypotheses, in-bloc and out-bloc cues respectively decrease and increase the likelihood of flagging a post as inappropriate. Exploratory analyses show that selective enforcement is concentrated among radical partisans, and that it manifests asymmetrically. While Podemos partisans exempt their in-group from democratic norm enforcement, Vox partisans enforce norms significantly less overall, unless violated by an out-group. These findings emphasise that democratic norm enforcement is conditional on intergroup dynamics, while revealing the multidimensional nature of democratic hypocrisy.